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ACTUAL CAUSATION
ACTUAL CAUSATION IN NORTH CAROLINA TORT
LAWt
ROBERT G. BYRD*
THE CONCEPT OF ACTUAL CAUSATION
Basic Issues Involved in A ctual Causation.
Liability in tort is imposed only when the wrongdoer's conduct is
an actual cause of the harm for which recovery is sought. Actual causa-
tion consists simply of the causal link between conduct and injury and
in many cases is so apparent from what has happened that it goes
unnoticed by courts and litigants alike. Nevertheless, actual causation
is an essential part of the plaintiff's cause of action and a failure to
allege' and prove2 it is fatal to his claim.
Although defendant has been negligent, he is not liable if his negli-
gence had nothing to do with plaintiffs injury.3 Proof that a car involved
in a collision was equipped with improper brakes4 or lights5 is insuffi-
cient to hold defendant liable when it appears that such defect played
no part in causing the accident. No liability attaches for defendant's
failure to light a stairway if the cause of plaintiffs fall down the stairs
was that she misjudged her step and not that she was unable to see in
the dark.' The omission of warning of a train's approach to a crossing
may be negligent, but no causal connection exists between the lack of
such a warning and the collision of an automobile with the forty-second
tThis article was prepared in cooperation with the North Carolina Law Center.
*Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.
'Battley v. Seaboard Airline Ry., I N.C. App. 384, 161 S.E.2d 750 (1968) (allegations of
slippery condition of floor due to defendant's negligence and of plaintiff's fall insufficient to state
cause of action because no allegation of causal connection). Compare Reynolds v. Murph, 241 N.C.
60, 64, 84 S.E.2d 273, 276-77 (1954) (conclusory allegation of causation sufficient unless "it
appears affirmatively from the complaint that there was no causal connection between the alleged
negligence and the injury").
2Phelps v. City of Winston-Salem, 272 N.C. 24, 157 S.E.2d 719 (1967); Hubbard v. Quality
Oil Co., 268 N.C. 489, 151 S.E.2d 71 (1966); Reason v. Singer Sewing Mach. Co., 259 N.C. 264,
130 S.E.2d 397 (1963).
3Miller v. Coppage, 261 N.C. 430, 135 S.E.2d 1 (1964); Wall v. Trogdon, 249 N.C. 747, 107
S.E.2d 757 (1959); Cranford v. Western Union Tel. Co., 138 N.C. 162, 50 S.E. 585 (1905).
4Beaman v. Duncan, 228 N.C. 600,46 S.E.2d 707 (1948).
5Oxedine v. Lowry, 260 N.C. 709, 133 S.E.2d 687 (1963) (bicycle); Morris v. Jenrette Transp.
Co., 235 N.C. 568, 70 S.E.2d 845 (1952) (truck).
'Carter v. Carolina Realty Co., 223 N.C: 188, 25 S.E.2d 553 (1943).
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car of the train; consequently, the railroad cannot be held liable.' Simi-
larly, the failure of an automobile driver to give a traffic signal is without
significance if the signal would not have been seen had it been given.8
While actual causation is a requisite to tort liability, its existence,
even when negligence has been established, does not always entitle plain-
tiff to recover For obvious reasons of fundamental fairness, when de-
fendant's negligence is not a cause of plaintiff's injury, defendant is not
liable and no further inquiry is needed." The existence of a cause-in-fact
relationship, however, does not establish liability since other factors
affecting legal responsibility remain to be considered." Such other fac-
tors have been taken into account to limit defendant's liability short of
all consequences his conduct may have caused. The requirement that
some harm of the general type that has occurred be foreseeable is the
overriding principle adopted by most courts to limit liability for negli-
gence.' 2 Through this broad principle courts have attempted to limit
liability to those risks on account of which defendant's conduct is found
to be negligent and thus to deny recovery for harm caused by other risks
whether they are associated with defendant's conduct or arise indepen-
dently of it.'3 In its broadest sweep the foreseeability rule has been ap-
7Chinnis v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 219 N.C. 528, 14 S.E.2d 500 (1941).
Clarke v. Holman, 274 N.C. 425, 163 S.E.2d 783 (1968); Cozart v. Hudson, 239 N.C. 279,
78 S.E.2d 881 (1954).
gBarefoot v. Joyner, 270 N.C. 388, 154 S.E.2d 543 (1967) (charge that permitted recovery upon
finding negligence and actual causation held erroneous); Ratliff v. Duke Power Co., 268 N.C. 605,
151 S.E.2d 641 (1966) (same).
10McNair v. Richardson, 244 N.C. 65, 92 S.E.2d 459 (1956) (charge that foresecability was
unnecessary if defendant's act was unlawful held erroneous).
"E.g., Williams v. Mickens, 247 N.C. 262, 100 S.E.2d 511 (1957) (intervening intentional
conduct; defendant who negligently left keys in car not liable for its negligent operation by thief);
Rulane Gas Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 231 N.C. 270, 56 S.E.2d 689 (1949) (intervening
negligent conduct; seller of defective hot water heater not liable for explosion when service man,
aware of presence of gas vapors, struck match which ignited them); Pugh v. Tidewater Power Co.,
237 N.C. 693, 75 S.E.2d 766 (1953) (unforeseeable risk; metal wire on which kite had flown came
into contact with defendant's uninsulated electric wires); Johnson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 184
N.C. 101, 113 S.E. 606 (1922) (no recovery for economic loss); Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C.
398, 55 S.E. 778 (1906) (no recovery for negligently inflicted mental harm unless contemporaneous
or resulting physical injury) (dictum).
"Ratliff v. Duke Power Co., 268 N.C. 605, 151 S.E.2d 641 (1966); Green v. Bowers, 230 N.C.
651, 55 S.E.2d 192 (1949).
3Belk v. Boyce, 263 N.C. 24, 138 S.E.2d 789 (1964) (cruelty-to-animal statute not intended
for protection of humans); Ward v. Southern Ry., 206 N.C. 530, 174 S.E. 443 (1934) (although
thieves could be anticipated, injury to bystander unforeseeable when stolen coal was thrown off car);
Brewster v. Elizabeth City, 137 N.C. 392, 49 S.E. 885 (1905) (plaintiff's failure to watch where he
was walking may not include risk that plank on which he stepped would "fly up" and hit him);
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plied by courts to deny liability in any case in which they felt justice
required such a result, and some of these opinions are questionable both
in the determination to take the case from the jury and in the decjsion
on the merits. 4
The usual question to arise under actual causation is that of the
connection between two events-the defendant's conduct and the plain-
tiff's injury. Whether that connection exists is simply a matter of obser-
vation of the usual relationship between events that knowledge and ex-
perience indicate to exist. However, another problem has also generally
been handled by courts as one of actual causation. Even though such a
causal link exists between defendant's negligence and plaintiffs injury,
his negligence is not considered an actual cause of the injury if the harm
would have resulted without such negligence. Thus, when the front
wheels of a truck driven backwards in violation of a statute by defendant
hit a child who was under the truck, the backing of the truck is not
regarded as an actual cause of the child's death if he would have been
struck by the rear wheels had the truck been driven forward.1 5 On the
same basis, the excessive speed at which defendant drove his car is not
an actual cause of a collision that could not have been avoided if he had
been driving at a reasonable speed." Similarly, the absence of a protec-
tive barrier at a race track is not an actual cause of injury to a spectator
when such a barrier, had it been present, would have provided no protec-
tion when a car left the track at a speed of 120 miles an hour. 7
This causal limitation on liability, like that which requires a connec-
tion between conduct and harm, is one of basic fairness. Defendant
Roseman v. Carolina Cent. R.R., 112 N.C. 709, 16 S.E. 766 (1893) (ejection of railroad passenger
who was in apparent control of his faculties no basis for liability when ejected passenger found
frozen in puddle of water).
"E.g., Wood v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 228 N.C. 605, 46 S.E.2d 717 (1948) (telephone pole
maintained within six inches of traveled portion of street; no reason to foresee arm of automobile
driver extending out of car window will strike it); Lee v. Carolina Upholstery Co., 227 N.C. 88, 40
S.E.2d 688 (1946) (plaintiff fell down open elevator shaft when rope on which he was pulling slipped
out of his hand; no ,reason to foresee danger to plaintiff after he had moved several yards away
from elevator before it was moved); Ferguson v. City of Asheville, 213 N.C. 569, 197 S.E. -146
(1938) (driver's negligence in failing to discover ramp negligently placed in street by city relieved
city of liability to third party); Newell v. Darnell, 209 N.C. 254, 183 S.E. 374 (1936) (negligence
of driver whose car struck plaintiff when he stepped into street unforeseeable to defendant who had
obstructed sidewalk).
"SHam v. Greensboro Ice & Fuel Co., 204 N.C. 614, 169 S.E. 180 (1933).
"Holland v. Malpass, 255 N.C. 395, 121 S.E.2d 576 (1961).
TLane v. Eastern Carolina Drivers Ass'n, 253 N.C. 764, 117 S.E.2d 737 (1961).
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should not be liable for harm plaintiff would have suffered even if defen-
dant had not been negligent. However, the problem is not so simple as
that of determining the existence of a causal link between conduct and
harm. It involves inquiry not only about what has actually happened but
also about what would have happened under circumstances that never
in fact occurred. The alternative set of hypothetical circumstances to be
constructed is not always easy to identify.18 When defendant parks his
car on the wrong side of the road, there is no more reason to hypothesize
that had he not been negligent, he would have parked on the same side
of the road than to suppose that he would have parked on the other side
of the road. Further, the determination of what would have happened
under a different set of circumstances is not without difficulty. While an
adequate protective barrier may not have prevented a car traveling at
120 miles an hour from leaving the race track, its speed probably would
have been reduced by collision with the barrier or its direction may have
been altered. In one instance less severe injuries may have been inflicted
upon plaintiff; in the other he may have escaped injury altogether. Simi-
larly, when defendant's speeding car runs over and injures someone, it
may be clear that defendant would have been unable to avoid the colli-
sion had he been driving at a safe speed, but it is less apparent that the
same injuries would have been inflicted whether defendant was driving
at twenty or forty miles an hour. 9 Of course, to the extent that the court
requires proof of the amount of aggravation caused by defendant's con-
duct in this type of case, the fact that defendant's negligence may have
increased the injuries which arose out of the accident may be of little
practical importance because plaintiff would seldom be able to offer
such proof.2
Although these two limitations on liability are in some ways quite
"
8E.g., Goldstein v. Southern Ry., 188 N.C. 636, 125 S.E. 177 (1924). Plaintiff skidded off a
road into an unguarded excavation on defendant's property. The court, in finding causation,
observed: "If the hole or excavation had not been there, or if a fence or rail had been erected between
the road and the hole, the plaintiff would not have been injured." Id. at 639, 125 S.E. at 178. The
court did not consider whether warning, without more, would have constituted reasonable care. If
a warning would have been sufficient-and it probably would not have been under the circumstan-
ces-the accident that occurred could have happened although adequate warning had been given.
See also McIntyre v. Monarch Elevator & Mach. Co., 230 N.C. 539, 54 S.E.2d 45 (1949). A
dissenting opinion argues persuasively that adequate warning would not have prevented the fall of
a woman who had "blacked out" down open elevator shaft. Id. at 547, 54 S.E.2d at 50.
"Middleton v. Melbourne Tramway & Omnibus Co., 16 Commw. L.R. 572 (Austl. 1913).
2'Cf. Fox v. Hollar, 257 N.C. 65, 125 S.E.2d 334 (1962).
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distinct, both have been encompassed in a single rule that has become
the primary tool for determining the existence of actual causation-the
"but for" or "sine qua non" rule. 21 If injury to plaintiff would not have
occurred "but for" defendant's negligence, causation exists; if plaintiffs
injury would have resulted without the defendant's negligence, his negli-
gence is not its cause. Application of the rule precludes liability both
when no causal link exists between conduct and harm and also when,
although a connection exists, the accident would have occurred without
defendant's negligence.
The basic purpose of the "but for" rule is to exclude liability when
fairness requires it, but despite its general suitability for this purpose, in
one situation it does not work well. General agreement exists, at least
in the few cases that have considered the problem 22 that when two causes
either of which is capable of causing the injury combine to bring the
injury about, a defendant who is responsible for one of them is liable.
When two motorcycles passing at the same time, one of which is driven
by defendant, frighten plaintiffs horsey or when a fire set by defendant
joins with another fire and the merged fire burns plaintiff's property,
defendant is held liable. 24
That either motorcycle rider should escape liability because the
other's conduct by itself would have caused the event is totally unaccept-
able. Such a result would permit two wrongdoers to escape liability for
harm clearly risked by their negligence and leave an innocent plaintiff
to bear the loss that their conduct caused. However, to hold defendant
liable in the merged-fire cases when one of the fires is of innocent origin
is more difficult to justify. Since defendant's negligence has combined
with another cause to produce the same injury that would have occurred
had the other cause not been present, it may be argued that his attempt
2 Ratliffv. Duke Power Co., 268 N.C. 605, 614, 151 S.E.2d 641,648 (1966):
An event which is a "but for" cause of another event-that is, a cause without which
the second event would not have taken place-is not, necessarily, the proximate cause of
the second event. . . .[One event cannot be a proximate cause of another if, had the
first event not occurred, the second would have occurred anyway ....
Lane v. Eastern Carolina Drivers Ass'n, 253 N.C. 764, 769, 117 S.E.2d 737, 741 (1961): "The
alleged negligence, to be actionable, must be so related to the injury that, but for such negligence,
injury would not have occurred."
2'%V. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 239 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER].
mCorey v. Havener, 182 Mass. 250, 65 N.E. 69 (1902).
21E.g., Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920).
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to escape liability deserves little sympathy. The difficulty with this argu-
ment is that its focus is wrong. The overriding purpose of tort law is to
compensate the injured, not to punish the wrongdoer. The issue is
whether denial of compensation will result in an injustice. Any injustice
in denying the injured party recovery for a loss that would have been
brought about by an innocent force anyway is not apparent. Application
of the rule to this situation must be defended, if at all, on grounds of
deterrence rather than compensation. Probably, however, the burden
should be placed on the defendant to show that the other fire was of
innocent origin.2
Out of such cases evolved a broader test under which defendant's
conduct is considered a cause of an accident if it is a substantial factor
in bringing it about. 2 The substantial-factor test involves the determina-
tion not only of the extent to which defendant's conduct has in fact
played a part in bringing about the injury but also whether the contribu-
tion his conduct has made warrants holding him liable for the harm. 7
Its effect upon the determination of legal responsibility should be only
to exclude liability when defendant's conduct has made an insignificant
contribution to the harm or when the same harm would have resulted
without defendant's negligence. Identical results are achieved under the
"but for" and substantial-factor test of actual causation except when
causes coalesce to produce injury, a situation in which the "but for"
formula has proved to be inadequate.
Neither the trial nor appellate courts in North Carolina seem to
employ the substantial-factor rule; however, no cases in which the "but
for" rule was not adequate to deal with the causal issue could be found.
The usual formula used by North Carolina courts merges actual and
proximate cause into a single issue: Proximate cause is a cause that
produced the result in continuous sequence and without which it would
not have occurred, and one from which any man of ordinary prudence
could have foreseen that such a result was probable under all the facts
as they existed. 28 In cases in which other causes intervene between defen-
dant's conduct and plaintiff's injury, the court sometimes employs a
'Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 191 Wis. 610,211 N.W. 913 (1927).
2$REsTAThmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431-33 (1965).
2Id. § 431, Comment a.
28E.g., Barefoot v. Joyner, 270 N.C. 388, 393, 154 S.E.2d 543, 547 (1967); Nance v. Parks,
266 N.C. 206, 209, 146 S.E.2d 24, 27 (1966).
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concept similar to the substantial-factor test by reasoning that original
negligence cannot be insulated "so long as it plays a substantial part in
the injury. '29 However, considerations that influence the determination
of legal responsibility other than the effect of defendant's conduct in
bringing about the accident seem to be relied upon by the court in these
cases.
When Satisfactory Proof of Causation Is Impossible.
Natural antipathy of holding a defendant liable for harm he has not
caused may sometimes induce an unwarranted skepticism of the ade-
quacy of proof to show causation. Unusually stringent proof require-
ments found in occasional cases 0 and unsympathetic regard for the
probative value of evidence of causation in others 3' may in part reflect
this concern to avoid imposition of liability upon an innocent party. This
same concern may go far to explain cases like Whitehead v. Carolina
Telephone and Telegraph Co.32 In that case the complaint alleged that
immediately after a small fire had been discovered on plaintiff's prop-
erty, an attempt was made to notify the fire department; that because
of defendant's negligence communication with the fire department was
delayed about twenty minutes; and that if the notice had been promptly
communicated, the fire department could have put out the fire before it
destroyed plaintiff's property. The court held that a demurrer to the
complaint was properly sustained. The decision seems to be based
largely upon the fact that whatever proof might have been offered, uncer-
nE.g., Porter v. Pitt, 261 N.C. 482, 135 S.E.2d 42 (1964); Watters v. Parrish, 252 N.C. 787,
115 S.E.2d 1 (1960).
3°E.g., Phelps v. City of Winston-Salem, 272 N.C. 24, 28, 157 S.E.2d 719, 722 (1967) (empha-
sis by the court):
In criminal cases, [circumstantial evidence] must point unerringly to the guilt of the
defendant and, in effect, must show not only that the defendant is guilty but that upon
no reasonable interpretation of the evidence could he be innocent. And also, that if the
evidence is consistent with a finding of either guilt or innocence that the innocent interpre-
tation must be adopted.
The law in civil cases is so similar that little difference can be found. . . . And it is
not sufficient to show that the circumstantial evidence introduced could have produced
the result-it must show that it did.
J.S. Moore & Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 173 N.C. 311, 318, 92 S.E. 1, 4 (1917) (concurring
opinion). "[T]here must be more than bare evidence of a possibility, or even a probability .
Id. at 318, 92 S.E. at 4.
31See text accompanying notes 104-17 infra.
32190 N.C. 197, 129 S.E. 602 (1925).
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tainties would have remained about the effect of the delay and thus that
the causal relationship was basically incapable of satisfactory proof.
Undoubtedly there are cases in which the causal connection between
negligence and injury is not capable of very satisfactory proof. When a
drowned child is found in a swimming pool, uncertainty inevitably exists
over whether the presence of a life guard would have saved the child's
life. 33 And because the circumstances under which the drowning occurred
are unknown, that uncertainty is incapable of resolution in terms of
probabilities. "The heart of plaintiff's case is the stark fact that the
lifeless body of a boy was found in defendant's . . . unguarded pool. 34
Similarly, whether a warning label on a jug of gasoline would have
prevented an unknown third person from exposing it to a blow torch is
essentially an unanswerable inquiry .3
A comparable problem is presented by cases in which available
evidence permits only the determination that defendant's conduct has
deprived plaintiff of a chance to avoid the injury. The only reasonable
evaluation of evidence of delay in setting a fracture" or in delivering
medication 37 may be that it reduced the patient's chances of recovery.
If in these cases the chance itself can be valued and is recognized as a
legally protectible interest, no significant causation problem exists. 31
However, if the chance cannot be valued, recovery must be sought for
the injury itself, and proof of the chance seldom will be enough to show
the required causal connection.
The question raised by these cases may be dealt with in terms of
the sufficiency of the evidence for submission of the issue of causation
to the jury.39 It has been suggested that because the injury is the very
one risked by defendant's conduct, the court should view with some
liberality the sufficiency of the evidence and leave it to the jury to deter-
"Bell v. Page, 271 N.C. 396, 156 S. E.2d 711 (1967) (evidence that nine-year-old boy discovered
drowned in pool and that statute requiring fence or watchmen violated held sufficient).
'"Id. at 400, 156 S.E.2d at 715.
"Reynolds v. Murph, 241 N.C. 60, 84 S.E.2d 273 (1954) (allegation held sufficient but recog-
nized that if identity of third person remains unknown proof of causation will be difficult).
uGower v. Davidian, 212 N.C. 172, 193 S.E. 28 (1937) (proof held insufficient).
'Byrd v. Southern Express Co., 139 N.C. 273, 51 S.E. 851 (1905) (proof held insufficient).
"'E.g., Kansas City, M. & 0. Ry. v. Bell, 197 S.W. 322 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) (recognized right
to recover for loss of chance to win first prize in hog show).
31E.g., Rovegno v. San Jose Knights of Columbus Hall Ass'n, 108 Cal. App. 591, 291 P. 848
(1st Dist. 1930) (drowning case; evidence held sufficient for submission to jury).
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mine if causation has been proved.4 0 A difficulty with this suggestion is
that what is involved is neither fact nor inference. The issues are whether
the basic requirements for legal responsibility are to be changed and
whether recovery is to be allowed when defendant's negligence has not
been shown to be the likely cause of the injury. Those issues seem pecu-
liarly for the judge rather than the jury to decide. That, for example, the
risk of drownings is increased by the absence of lifeguards and the
danger of gasoline by the failure to label it is an important consideration
in the determination of this issue. Also important is the fact that proof
beyond what the plaintiff has offered is not possible. Finally, to some
extent at least, defendant's conduct has helped to create the plight in
which the plaintiff is caught.4 1 All of these considerations strongly sug-
gest the need for modification of the rule of actual causation to permit
recovery in appropriate cases 42 when normal proof requirements cannot
be met. 43 However, to effect such change by submission of the case to
the jury under instructions that, to hold the defendant liable, it must find
causation is not only to disguise the issue but also to leave its outcome
to the impulses of the jury. Even the court's consideration of the problem
in the context of the sufficiency of the proof to show actual causation
produces inconsistent results. 44
MULTIPLE CAUSES
A negligent defendant may be liable even though his conduct was
"
0 PRossER 243.
"These considerations have caused courts to modify the causation rule in other cases involving
more than one cause. See p. 274 infra.
4Other proof or its availability to plaintiff may make unnecessary or inappropriate any special
rule for determining liability. E.g., Justice v. Prescott, 258 N.C. 781, 129 S.E.2d 479 (1963) (per
curiam) (boy found dead in pool but no proof he drowned; life guards on duty but neither they nor
other swimmers observed plaintiff in trouble; evidence held insufficient); Godfrey v. Western Caro-
lina Power Co., 190 N.C. 24, 128 S.E. 485 (1925) (substantial evidence presented to establish
causation).
43See Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966), noted in 45 N.C.L. REv. 799 (1967);
Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 310 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1962). The suggestion has been
made that policy considerations should and do in several ways assume an important role in deci-
sions relating to actual causation. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60
passim (1956).
"Compare Bell v. Page, 271 N.C. 396, 156 S.E.2d 711 (1967), with Whitehead v. Carolina
Tel. & Tel. Co., 190 N.C. 197, 129 S.E. 602 (1925).
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not the sole cause of the harm that has occurred.45 If such conduct has
played a significant part in causing an injury, liability may attach even
though other causes have contributed to bring about such injury. Defen-
dant is responsible for the entire harm when his negligence concurs with
that of a third party or a nonculpable cause to precipitate an accident."
Further, a direct physical connection between defendant's conduct and
plaintiff's harm is not required, and when the injury arises out of risks
defendant's conduct has created, defendant may be liable although he
was not involved in the accident itself.47 For example, when defendant's
negligence threatens a collision between his car and another, and the
driver of the other car through evasive action avoids that collision but
in doing so is injured in a different way, defendant is liable."
Concert of Action.
In two situations a wrongdoer may be liable even though no causal
link exists between his conduct and the accident. Although neither situa-
tion necessarily involves more than one cause, they are discussed here
because they, like the cases involving multiple causes, raise the issue
whether a defendant is to be held responsible for harm brought about
by causes other than his own conduct. When two or more persons act
in concert in the commission of a tort, each participant is held liable for
"Safeguard Ins. Co. v. Wilmington Cold Storage Co., 267 N.C. 679, 149 S.E.2d 27 (1966)
(defendant's negligence concurred with Act of God); Watters v. Parrish, 252 N.C. 787, 115 S.E.2d
1 (1960) (concurring negligence); Pugh v. Smith, 247 N.C. 264, 100 S.E.2d 503 (1957) (error to
place burden on plaintiff to show defendant's negligence was the cause of his injuries); Godwin v.
Johnson Cotton Co., 238 N.C. 627, 78 S.E.2d 772 (1953) (same). Cf. Belk v. Boyce, 263 N.C. 24,
138 S.E.2d 789 (1964) (charge that defendant's negligence must be the cause of injuries upheld when
no evidence of other causes); Harris v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 230 N.C. 485, 53 S.E.2d 536
(1949) (error to charge defendant's negligence need not be the sole cause when no evidence of other
causes).
"See text accompanying notes 69-82 infra.
4"Slaughter v. Slaughter, 264 N.C. 732, 142 S.E.2d 683 (1965) (plaintiff, frightened by defen-
dant's conduct, fell while running away); Langford v. Shu, 258 N.C. 135, 128 S.E.2d 210 (1962)
(plaintiff stepped into brick wall when frightened by practical joke); Morgan v. Bell Bakeries, Inc.,
246 N.C. 429, 98 S.E.2d 464 (1957) (truck, in effort to avoid collision with defendant's truck,
jacknifed across road and was struck by oncoming truck).
"Underwood v. Gay, 268 N.C. 715, 151 S.E.2d 590 (1966) (per curiam) (plaintiff, in taking
evasive action to avoid striking defendant's car, ran off road); Robertson v. Ghee, 262 N.C. 584,
138 S.E.2d 220 (1964) (defendant's negligence caused wreck in which passenger was thrown onto
road; plaintiff, in taking evasive action to avoid striking passenger, ran off road); Bondurant v.
Mastin, 252 N.C. 113, 130 S.E.2d 292 (1960) (plaintiff, in taking evasive action, collided with
oncoming truck).
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the acts of the others. 49 "[W]here there is a common intent to assault
and beat, or where the parties are all present at the beating . . . or are
guilty as abettors by reason of counsel or encouragement given before-
hand, each is guilty of the whole . . . ." The traditional rule relating
to concert of action requires common design and community of action
in carrying it out.5' The theory for imposition of liability is that under
such circumstances a joint enterprise or agency is established, and each
participant becomes vicariously liable for the actions of the group.
The North Carolina court seems to have extended the concert-of-
action rule52 to deal with the broader issue of defendant's liability for
harm that other causes have helped to produce when the facts do not fit
within the narrow confines of vicarious liability. Joint and several liabil-
ity has been imposed for harm occurring by the independent and sepa-
rate acts of several tortfeasors in discharging sewerage into a stream that
runs through plaintiff's property 53 or in washing sediment onto his
land. In the early cases 5 the court attached some importance to the fact
that each wrongdoer had acted with knowledge of what the others were
doing and of the effect their combined actions were likely to have. That
defendant's knowledge may not have been crucial to these decisions,
however, is suggested by the court's view that constructive knowledge,
based upon the fact that such activity by others was taking place, was
sufficient. 6 The true basis for this line of decisions may be more accur-
ately reflected in a recent opinion. In Phillips v. Hassett Mining Co.,57
"
9 Nye v. Pure Oil Co., 257 N.C. 477, 126 S.E.2d 48 (1962) (conspiracy to defraud); Garrett v.
Garrett, 228 N.C. 530, 46 S.E.2d 302 (1948) (assault and battery); Williams v. Cape Fear Lumber
Co., 176 N.C. 174, 96 S.E. 950 (1918) (concert or agreement may be established by circumstantial
evidence).
Smithwick v. Ward, 52 N.C. 64, 67 (1859).
5'PROSSER 29 1.
"Even in applying the concert-of-action rule, a liberal view seems to be taken by the court.
Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Peirce, 195 N.C. 717, 718, 143 S.E. 524,525 (1928) ("the allegation
of a general course of dealing and systematic policy of wrongdoing, concealment and mismanage-
ment, virtually amounting to a conspiracy, in which the defendants are all charged with having
participated at different times and in varying degrees" which tend to a single end is enough).
53Phillips v. Hassett Mining Co., 244 N.C. 17,92 S.E.2d 429 (1956); Stowe v. City of Gastonia,
231 N.C. 157, 56 S.E.2d 413 (1949); Lineberger v. City of Gastonia, 196 N.C. 445, 146 S.E. 79
(1929); Moses v. Town of Morganton, 192 N.C. 102, 133 S.E. 421 (1926).
54McKinney v. Deneen, 231 N.C. 540,58 S.E.2d 107 (1950).
0Lineberger v. City of Gastonia, 196 N.C. 445, 146 S.E. 79 (1929); Moses v. Town of
Morganton, 192 N.C. 102, 133 S.E. 421 (1926).
-41d.
57244 N.C. 17, 92 S.E.2d 429 (1956).
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the court said: "Concert of action is not a requisite of joint tortfeasor-
ship. . . .If the independent wrongful acts of two or more persons unite
in producing a single indivisible injury, the parties are joint tortfeasors
within the meaning of the law, and the injured party may sue only one
or all the tortfeasors, as he may elect."5 8
Most of the North Carolina cases have involved nuisances and are
opposed to the majority view that rejects joint and several liability for
consequential harm resulting from the independent acts of several tort-
feasors.59 Courts that follow the majority view frequently allow damages
to be apportioned among such tortfeasors on the basis of any evidence,
however minimal, that will permit a rough apportionment to be made."
One North Carolina case has held that damages should be apportioned
among tortfeasors when the evidence provides a basis for doing so.,'
Thus the two views may coalesce in cases in which some basis for appor-
tionment of damages exists. However, when no basis on which to appor-
tion damages can be found, the majority rule permits the wrongdoers
to escape liability altogether and imposes on the innocent injured person
the loss they have caused. The North Carolina position permits recovery
in such situations, and, although it may result in imposing liability on a
wrongdoer for injury he has not caused, such an outcome seems prefera-
ble to that reached under the majority view.
Double Fault-Alternative Liability Cases.
A similar problem arises in cases, none of which seem to have arisen
ifn North Carolina, that are said to involve double fault and alternative
liability.62 Although the fault of two or more wrongdoers may be estab-
lished, it may be clear that the conduct of only one has resulted in the
1Id. at 22,92 S.E.2d at 433.
51E.g., Farley v. Crystal Coal & Coke Co., 85 W. Va. 595, 102 S.E. 265 (1920); Chipman v.
Palmer, 77 N.Y. 51 (1879).
"PROSSER 317-18.
61Long v. Swindell, 77 N.C. 176 (1877).
While the separate action of each defendant causes the single injury, the share of each in
causing it, is separable, and may be accurately measured. It is, caeteris paribus, as they
seem to have been here, proportionate to the area which he drains upon the plaintiff.
Under these circumstances it would be unjust and unreasonable to assess joint damages,
by which the possessor of ten acres drained would pay as much as the possessor of fifty
acres. ...
Id. at 184-85.
"PROSSER 243.
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injury. If the one whose conduct caused the injury can be identified, he,
but not the others, is liable. On the other hand, if the proof establishes
that the conduct of one of the wrongdoers caused the harm but fails to
identify who is responsible, a causal connection between the injury and
the fault of any of the tortfeasors has not been established. The classic
illustration of this type of situation is that in which two hunters negli-
gently shot at the same time in plaintiff's direction and a pellet, which
could have come from either gun, hit him.13
Although in this situation the conduct of one of the negligent parties
has caused no injury, the issue that confronts the court is much the same
as that involved in the nuisance cases: Strict insistence upon proof of
causation precludes any recovery by the plaintiff, while imposition of
joint and several liability holds one party responsible for harm he has
not caused. The choice between these alternatives is one of policy, not
of fact. Faced with this choice, courts have imposed joint and several
liability on grounds either that concert of action existed64 or that the
burden to show causation should be shifted to the defendants and that
upon failure of such proof each is to be held liable. 5 Here, as in the
nuisance cases, not only the plaintiffs 'injury but also the uncertainty
about the causation issue has been created by the defendants' conduct.
In the nuisance cases, however, the defendants are more likely to be in
better position than the plaintiff to produce evidence that will permit
some apportionment of damages to be made. Still, on balance, a fairer
result is achieved in these as well as the nuisance cases by holding defen-
dants liable than by denying plaintiff any right of recovery.
One group of cases has extended the double fault-alternative liabil-
ity rule by finding several defendants' liable when uncertainty existed
about who among them was negligent as well as about causation. The
leading case is Ybarra v. Spangard,6 in which res ipsa loquitur was
applied to permit plaintiff, who had been injured by an external blow
while undergoing an operation, to recover against several doctors and
nurses who had participated in the operation, although no agency or
other relationship existed so as to render any of them vicariously liable
61Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948); Moore v. Foster, 182 Miss. 15, 180 So.
73 (1938); Oliver v. Miles, 144 Miss. 852, 110 So. 666 (1927).
"Moore v. Foster, 182 Miss. 15, 180 So. 73 (1938); Oliver v. Miles, 144 Miss. 852, 110 So.
666 (1927).
1Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
A25 Cal. 2d 486, 15J4 P.2d 687 (1944).
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for the acts of the others. While it is possible that the injury could have
resulted from the negligence of any of them, it is also clear that the
negligence of one or more could have caused the injury and that the
others were free of fault. The court, finding the evidence sufficient
against all defendants, emphasized that the group worked as a team in
performing the operation and that the defendants were in a better posi-
tion to account for what had happened than the plaintiff who was uncon-
scious during the operation. The most consistent application of res ipsa
against multiple defendants has been against defendants who form a
chain of distribution for the marketing of products.67 In an occasional
case in which no unity among the defendants is present, the doctrine has
also been applied.68 No North Carolina cases could be found in which
an attempt was made to rely upon res ipsa under these circumstances.
Concurring Negligence.
At common law when the negligence of two or more persons con-
curred to produce a single impact and indivisible injuries, each wrong-
doer was held liable for the entire loss. This rule continues to be the law.69
Thus when a train and a car collide at a crossing 7 or two cars collide
on the highway 7' and the operator of each vehicle is negligent, each is
liable for all harm which results from the collision. In such cases, al-
though neither concert of action nor any other relationship between the
parties exists and each acts independently of the other, their actions
concur to produce a single result and no apportionment of damages
among them is possible. Since each has contributed to the injury, each
must be held liable for all the damages unless plaintiff is to be denied
recovery or some arbitrary apportionment is to be made. That the tort-
"Dement v. Olin-Mathieson Chem. Corp., 282 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1960); Loch v. Confair, 372
Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953) (manufacturer and retailer); Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d
317 (1953) (manufacturer, distributor, and retailer); Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682,
268 P.2d 1041 (1953) (manufacturer and others).
gSGauthreaux v. Hogan, 185 So. 2d 44 (La. Ct. App. 1966) (two-car collision); Raber v. Tumin,
36 Cal. 2d 654, 226 P.2d 574 (1951) (fall of ladder).
69E.g., Wise v. Vincent, 265 N.C. 647, 144 S.E.2d 877 (1965); Tillman v. Bellamy, 242 N.C.
201, 87 S.E.2d 253 (1955); White v. Carolina Realty Co., 182 N.C. 536, 109 S.E. 564 (1921).70E.g., Earwood v. Southern Ry., 192 N.C. 27, 133 S.E. 180 (1926).
7E.g., Turner v. Turner, 261 N.C. 472, 135 S.E.2d 12 (1964); Stockwell v. Brown, 254 N.C,
662, 119 S.E.2d 795 (1961).
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feasors acted at different times makes no difference; 72 what is important
is that their negligence has combined to bring about a single result. One
tortfeasor may act upon a condition created by the other, as when one
defendant runs into a car negligently parked by the other73 or a railway
car strikes a negligently maintained power line pole. 74 However, in situa-
tions in which another's negligence intervenes between a tortfeasor's act
and the plaintiff's injury, policies other than those involved in actual
causation may relieve the tortfeasor of all liability.7 5
For the same reasons entire liability has also been recognized when
defendant's conduct concurs with innocent causes to bring about an
accident .7  Liability has been imposed when the wind upended a board
defendant had left insecurely fastened 77 or spread a fire he had left unat-
tended; 78 when a flood broke through a negligently constructed dam;79
and when lightning set fire to a hazardous condition he had permitted
to exist.80 Similarly, recovery against the defendant has been allowed
when plaintiff's or another's nonnegligent conduct concurred in causing
the accident 81 or when an unknown cause has contributed in bringing it
about.8"
Successive Impacts.
Because of "chain-collision" automobile accidents, the question of
"Hayes v. City of Wilmington, 243 N.C. 525, 91 S.E.2d 673 (1956) (negligently laid gas pipe
struck by grading machine); Price v. City of Monroe, 234 N.C. 666, 68 S.E.2d 283 (1951) (negli-
gently driven car ran into ditch defendant had excavated across street).
"E.g., Grimes v. Gibert, 6 N.C. App. 304, 170 S.E.2d 65 (1969).
7"Ramsey v. Carolina-Tennessee Power Co., 195 N.C. 788, 143 S.E. 861 (1928).
71E.g., Williams v. Mickens, 247 N.C. 262, 100 S.E.2d 511 (1957) (intervening intentional
conduct; defendant who negligently left keys in car not liable for its negligent operation by thief);
Rulane Gas Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 231 N.C. 270, 56 S.E.2d 689 (1949) (intervening
negligent conduct; seller of defective hot water heater not liable for explosion when service man,
aware of presence of gas vapors, struck match which ignited them).
"Safeguard Ins. Co. v. Wilmington Cold Storage Co., 267 N.C. 679, 149 S.E.2d 27 (1966)
(Act of God); Dillon v. Raleigh, 124 N.C. 184, 32 S.E. 548 (1899) (frightened horse bolted and
ran into obstruction negligently maintained in street).
"Ridge v. Norfolk Southern R.R., 167 N.C. 510, 83 S.E. 762 (1914).
"Gibbon v. Lamm, 183 N.C. 421, 111 S.E. 618 (1922).
"Supervisor & Comm'rs v. Jennings, 181 N.C. 393, 107 S.E. 312 (1921).
81Lawrence v. Yadkin River Power Co., 190 N.C. 664, 130 S.E. 735 (1925).
8 Pinyan v. Settle, 263 N.C. 578, 139 S.E.2d 863 (1965); Adams v. State Bd. of Educ., 248"
N.C. 506, 103 S.E.2d 854 (1958); Graham v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 240 N.C. 338, 82 S.E.2d
346 (1954).
82Stone v. Texas Co., 180 N.C. 546, 105 S.E. 425 (1920) (gasoline spillage ignited in unknown
way).
1972]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the liability of several defendants whose conduct has caused injuries
through separate impacts has been frequently litigated in recent years.
The negligence of the defendant who caused the first collision created a
situation on which the others acted and may be regarded as a cause of
all the harm. 3 However, the negligence of defendants involved in subse-
quent collisions cannot be regarded as the cause of injuries received in
earlier impacts. The combined effect of the several impacts may be an
indivisible injury or separate injuries which cannot be related to any
specific impact. When uncertainty exists concerning the injuries inflicted
by each defendant, courts have permitted the plaintiff to recover either
by recognizing that the injuries were incapable of apportionment or by
shifting the burden on apportionment to the defendant.8
When substantial time elapses between impacts, imposition of en-
tire liability upon several defendants is more questionable.85 If the im-
pacts are sufficiently separated in time so as to afford opportunity to
the injured person to ascertain the harm inflicted by each, the inability
to produce evidence of apportionment is caused by the plaintiff's inac-
tion and not by the acts of defendants. Under such circumstances no
injustice arises by placing the burden on the plaintiff to show what harm
has been caused by such defendant. Of course, if the nature of the injuries
precludes any determination of the extent of harm caused by each defen-
dant, the passage of time may be immaterial, except that at some point
in time defendant's liability for subsequent events is likely to be termi-
nated.
When no appreciable time lapse occurs between impacts, the North
Carolina court has imposed joint and several liability upon the defen-
dants in cases involving successive impacts.8 6 The court has reached this
result by holding the defendants to be concurring tortfeasors. Use of this
theory in one case may have blurred the nature of the issue involved and
thereby resulted in a questionable decision. In Fox v. Hollar87 the initial
'E.g., Hall v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 234 N.C. 206, 67 S.E.2d 63 (1951) (plaintiff, dazed by
collision, walked into path of another car; negligent defendant who caused collision liable for
injuries caused by second car).
"Maddux v. Donaldson, 362 Mich. 425, 108 N.W.2d 33 (1961); Note, 44 NC.L. REv. 249
(1965).
'See Loui v. Oakley, 50 Hawaii 260,438 P.2d 393 (1968).
"Gatlin v. Parsons, 257 N.C. 469, 126 S.E.2d 51 (1962); Riddle v. Artis, 243 N.C. 668, 91
S.E.2d 894 (1956); Barber v. Wooten, 234 N.C. 107, 66 S.E.2d 690 (1951); Lewis v. Hunter, 212
N.C. 504, 193 S.E. 814 (1937); Vest v. Collins Baking Co., 208 N.C. 526, 181 S.E. 551 (1935).
-257 N.C. 65, 125 S.E.2d 334 (1962).
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collision was an unavoidable accident, but the second impact was caused
by defendant's negligence. The court, observing that under these circum-
stances the concurring-negligence- theory was inapplicable, held that
plaintiff could recover only for such injuries as he could show were
caused by the second collision.
In other cases8 entire liability of all defendants has not been im-
posed because the evidence failed to show any damage that was inflicted
by one of the impacts. A strict interpretation of these cases might suggest
that they are inconsistent with the imposition of joint and several liabil-
ity in cases involving successive impacts. However, a better interpreta-
tion of them may be to limit their holding to situations in which it
affirmatively appears, at least to some extent, that no injury was in-
flicted by one of the impacts. Such a view seems sound and does not
conflict with the basic rule imposing liability when separation of dam-
ages is not possible.
Summary.
General acceptance of entire liability for harm produced by concur-
ring causes exists when the causes other than defendant's negligence are
simply instrumentalities through which the harm risked by his conduct
is realized. In the usual situation in which the rule is applied, the other
causes would have produced no harm without the defendant's negli-
gence. When some injury to the plaintiff would have been effected by
another cause operating without defendant's negligence, greater reluc-
tance to impose liability for all the harm caused by the concurrence of
the two surfaces. This reluctance is evident in the nuisance cases, 9 in
those in which successive impacts occur" and in some cases in which
an Act of God concurs with defendant's negligence91 to cause injury. In
such cases the natural instinct is to apportion damages according to the
contribution each cause has made, and such a division is appropriate
"Gatlin v. Parsons, 257 N.C. 469, 126 S.E.2d 51 (1962); Riddle v. Artis, 246 N.C. 629, 99
S.E.2d 857 (1957). Two other cases involved similar facts but were decided on proximate-cause
questions. Copple v. Warner, 260 N.C. 737, 133 S.E.2d 641 (1963); Batts v. Faggart, 260 N.C.
641, 133 S.E.2d 504 (1963).
- See text accompanying notes 52-61 supra.
"See text accompanying notes 83-88 supra.
9 E.g., Cole v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 149 Kan. 25, 86 P.2d 740 (1939) (flood and obstruction
in river; alternative ground for holding no liability was failure to show extent defendant's negligence
contributed to harm).
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when the evidence provides a basis for it. A liberal view of the sufficiency
of the evidence to permit apportionment should be taken92 since a rough
division of damages may provide an acceptable adjustment of the need
to compensate plaintiff and the desire to limit defendant's liability to
harm he has caused. However, the appeal of this solution may lead to
an insistence upon proof by plaintiff that will permit apportionment and,
when such proof is not possible, to a denial of recovery. In this way the
apportionment rule, which seems so eminently fair, may subordinate the
interests of the plaintiff to those of the wrongdoer whose conduct has
contributed to bring about the injury and the uncertainty about the
extent of harm he has caused.
In view of all the developments relating to multiple causes, a rule
definitely seems to be emerging that permits recovery when apportion-
ment of damages is not possible. This result is achieved by shifting to
the wrongdoers the burden to show the harm for which other causes are
responsible and, upon failure of such proof, by holding them liable for
the entire harm. The Restatement has adopted this view.
PROOF OF CAUSATION
When Defendant's Negligence Is Capable of Causing Harm.
Actual causation, like any other fact, may be established by circum-
stantial evidence. 3 The inference of causation from other facts may be
an easy one. Thus, when a car being driven at an excessive speed or by
an intoxicated driver leaves the road, the obvious inference to be drawn
is that speed in the one instance94 and intoxication in the other"5 caused
loss of control of the car and the ensuing accident. Similarly, evidence
that a train engine was emitting sparks when it passed property on which
a fire was discovered immediately thereafter readily permits the infer-
92E.g., McAllister v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 Pa. 65, 187 A. 415 (1936).
9Drum v. Bisaner, 252 N.C. 305, 113 S.E.2d 560 (1960) (inference that faulty electrical wiring
caused fire); Nance v. Merchants' Fertilizer & Phosphate Co., 200 N.C. 702, 158 S.E. 486 (1931)
(inference that negligently released chemical waste killed hogs); Masten v. Texas Co., 194 N.C. 540,
140 S.E. 89 (1927) (inference that gasoline escaping from defendant's tank contaminated well);
Lawrence v. Yadkin River Power Co., 190 N.C. 664, 130S.E. 735 (1925) (inference that fire sta.ted
in foul right of way under electric transmission lines).
"Wilkerson v. Clark, 264 N.C. 439, 141 S.E.2d 884 (1965); Yates v. Chappell, 263 N.C. 461,
139 S.E.2d 728 (1965).
"
5Southern Nat'l Bank v. Lindsey, 264 N.C. 585, 142 S.E.2d 357 (1965).
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ence that the fire was set by sparks from the engine." Circumstantial
proof of causation, however, is not always so simple. The inference of
causation may be incident to a special mode of proof, such as the
similar-instances rule 97 or res ipsa loquitur,98 by which the circumstantial
evidence is held to establish a, prima facie case and the issues of fault
and causal connection are inseparably woven together.9 In these cases
the circumstances of the accident either alone or in conjunction with
evidence of other similar occurrences not-only identify the defendant's
negligence as a possible cause of the accident but also suggest that the
accident was caused more likely by defendant's negligence than by other
possible causes.'"' Further complexity arises because frequently the infer-
ence that arises under these special modes of proof merely indicates that
some negligence of the defendant was the probable cause of the injury
but seldom identifies a particular act or omission as its likely cause.
The use of direct evidence to prove actual causation usually raises
only the question of its credibility. If it is accepted, causation is estab-
lished; if it is rejected. the proof of causation fails. In contrast; circum-
stantial evidence, even. if accepted, leaves open the possibility of other
causes of the accident, and these must be weighed against the. possibility
that defendant's negligence was the cause. The existence of several possi-
ble causes of the accident does not prevent an inference that defendant's
negligence was its likely cause. Nor need the evidence exclude every other
possible cause before the inference can be drawn that defendant's negli-
gence was its probable cause.'
When defendant's negligence is established and the accident is one
that such negligence is likely to cause, the inference that defendant's
negligence was its probable cause is clearly permissible without direct
evidence establishing the causal connection. Thus when a car driven by
defendant at eighty miles an hour leaves the road and plunges into
"Betts v. Southern Ry., 230 N.C. 609, 55 S.E.2d 76 (1949).
"For a discussion of the similar-instances rule see Byrd, Proof of Negligence in North Caro-
lina-Part IL Similar Occurrences and Violation of Statute, 48 N.C.L. REv. 731-44 (1970).
"8For a discussion of res ipsa loquitur see Byrd, Proof of Negligence in North Carolina-Part
L Res Ipsa Loquitur, 48 N.C.L. REv. 452 (1970).
"
2See text accompanying notes 130-49 infra.
'®Young v. Anchor Co., 239 N.C. 288, 79 S.E.2d 785 (1954); Jones v. Bland, 182 N.C. 70,
108 S.E. 344 (1921).
'Greene v. Nichols, 274 N.C. 18, 161 S.E.2d 521 (1968) (unexplained single car accident);
Cherry v. Smallwood, 7 N.C. App. 392, 171 S.E.2d 83 (1969) (same).
1972]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
danger, the inference that excessive speed caused the accident seems
almost inescapable.102 Under these circumstances the chance that other
possible causes that have not been shown to have been actively operating
-at the time of the accident brought about the accident seems too remote
to assume any real significance. The absence of evidence that affirma-
tively shows that other possible causes were not in operation at the time /
of the accident does not weaken the inference materially. Further, the
inference is equally compelling whether defendant's negligence is estab-
lished by direct or circumstantial evidence.
Situations arise in which significant doubt about the cause of the
accident exists, despite the coincidence of defendant's negligence and the
accident and the correlation between them that normal experience indi-
cates. When defendant negligently permits part of his open land to be
covered with dry brush, debris, and other combustibles, the risk of a fire
is apparent. Yet when a general conflagration burns over a large area,
including defendant's property, and nothing indicates where the fire
began, the inference that the fire started on defendant's premises, though
permissible, is not clearly more compelling than other permissible infer-
ences.10 3 Even if the difficulty of finding the evidence of causation suffi-
cient in this type of case is conceded, two North Carolina cases involving
the origin of fires may fail to accord to circumstantial evidence the full
probative force it deserves.
In Maharias v. Weathers Brothers Moving & Storage,"' a fire
started in a room of defendant's warehouse that had been used for
polishing furniture. About one-half bushel of charred rags that had
furniture polish on them were found in the corner of the room where the
fire started. An expert expressed the opinion that the pile of rags "could
have caused spontaneous combustion." The court, stating that the evid-
enie raised only a conjecture, found it insufficient for submission to the
jury. In Phelps v. City of Winston-Salem"'5 defendant operated a pro-
1
"Wilkerson v. Clark, 264 N.C. 439, 141 S.E.2d 884 (1965). But see Crisp v. Medlin, 264 N.C.
314, 319, 141 S.E.2d 609, 612 (1965): "In our opinion, and we so hold, the mere fact that it can
be reasonably inferred from the evidence that the Chevrolet automobile was traveling at a very rapid
speed when it wrecked is not sufficient to permit a jury to find that such speed caused its wreck
'13The apparent holding in Maguire v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 154 N.C. 384, 70 S.E. 737 (1911),
is that proof of such circumstances is insufficient for submission to the jury.
1- 257 N.C. 767, 127 S.E.2d 548 (1962).
1-272 N.C. 24, 157 S.E.2d 719 (1967).
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duce market in which he rented stalls to sellers of produce. Defendant
retained general control of the premises. An oil tank, coal, and cylinders
of ethylene gas were stored in the market. The building was heated by
oil and coal stoves, one of which had a crack in it. Other flammable
material was in several sections of the building. Large quantities of
combustibles were piled on the roof of the building. A fire started in one
of the stalls, spread over the entire building, and destroyed property of
plaintiffs, who were three tenants in the market. The court again found
the evidence insufficient.
Both decisions seem wrong. In both defendant's negligence was
established, the negligent conduct created the risk of fire, and the place
where the fire started was located in a small area within which defen-
dant's negligence was in operation. Although under these circumstances
causes of the fire other than the defendant's negligence are possiblethe
more compelling inference is that the fire, the origin of which was local-
ized to a small area in which a known fire hazard existed, resulted from
that hazard and not from some unknown source. To say that such
evidence permits only conjecture and surmise, as the North Carolina
court did, practically denies the efficacy of circumstantial evidence as a
mode of proof.
Despite its verbalization, the test' 6 under which the North Carolina
court seems to determine the sufficiency of the evidence for submission
to the jury-evidence that permits a finding of more probable than
not-is not a mathematical formula from which to derive an inescapable
conclusion but is only a general guideline to assure that a fair foundation
exists for defendant's liability. The test is not designed to limit the jury's
role to that of resolving conflicting evidence and to place in the trial
judge or appellate court the evaluative determinations presented by the
evidence. Under our system those determinations are for the jury to
make, and the court's function is simply to ascertain that a determina-
tion in favor of the plaintiff is fairly permitted by the evidence. Serious
doubt exists that either Maharis or Phelps is consistent with these basic
ideas.
The court's analysis of the causation issue in the Phelps case may
'1See Drum v. Bisaner, 252 N.C. 305, 310, 113 S.E.2d 560, 564 (1960) ("the more reasonable
probability") & cases cited therein. When the court finds the proof insufficient, it typically observes
that "[t]he evidence raised a mere conjecture, surmise and speculation." E.g., vlatharais v. Weath-
ers Bros. Moving & Storage, 257 N.C. 767, 768, 127 S.E.2d 548, 549 (1962).
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be objectionable for another reason. The court seems to have rejected
the possibility that defendant's negligence in permitting large quantities
of combustibles to be on his premises so as to create a fire hazard
.provided a basis for holding him liable unless defendant also negligently
set the fire. Two statements of the court point this out: "Although there
is evidence that the fire started in the vicinity of the Blalock tomato shed
and its roof was cluttered with combustible and flammable materials
the only evidence relating to the cause of the ire is that it was 'un-
known.' "107 The court elaborated:
Here, combustible material was on the roof, there were oil burning
stoves with cracks in them, and flammable material was in several
sections of the building. For some of these conditions the [defendant]
might have been responsible, but the tenants and customers may have
been responsible for the remainder. People were sleeping in the building
and were coming in and going out all through the night. It is possible
that anyone of them may have let a lighted cigarette or a still-burning
match come in contact with some of the combustible material.'"
Defendant's negligence may have been causally related to the de-
struction of plaintiff's property in three ways. First, defendant negli-
gently maintained and permitted to be maintained by others conditions
that could have set the fire. Secondly, even if the source that set the fire
was something for which defendant was not responsible, it negligently
permitted combustibles and flammables to "clutter" the building and
thus created a substantial risk that they would be ignited in some way.
The fact that the fire was actually set by an Act of God,' a third
person,"0 or an unknown source"' does not eliminate defendant's negli-
gence as a cause. Thirdly, even if some unknown agency set the fire and
the fire originated outside the hazardous conditions created by defen-
101272 N.C. at 30, 157 S.E.2d at 723.
"'3272 N.C. at 31, 157 S.E.2d at 724.
'"Lawrence v. Yadkin River Power Co., 190 N.C. 664, 130 S.E. 735 (1925) (lightning caused
molten insulator to fall into dried grass and brush).
"'Cf. Shepard v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 251 N.C. 751, 112 S.E.2d 380 (1960) (ignition and explo-
sion of gas which had escaped from defective hot water heater sold by defendant and installed by
contractor in room without ventilation); Smith v. Shell Union Oil Co., 214 N.C. 824, 198 S.E.
622 (1938) (per curiam) (ignition by match and explosion of gasoline-kerosene mixture); Williams
v. Railroad, 140 N.C. 623, 53 S.E. 448 (1906) (defendant without fault set fire to his own unsafe
premises).
"'Newton v. Texas Co., 180 N.C. 561, 105 S.E. 433 (1920) (gasoline allowed to escape when
it could have been ignited by any of a number of sources).
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dant's negligence, those conditions may have been a substantial factor
in the spread of the fire beyond the area where it started. Admittedly,
the strength of the inference that the foul condition of defendant's prop-
erty is a substantial factor in the spread of fire depends upon the particu-
lar circumstances present. When a large area, including defendant's
property, has been consumed by a general conflagration, the possibility
looms large that the extent of the fire would have been the same regard-
less of the condition of defendant's property.112 However, if, as in Phelps,
it is shown that the quantity of combustible material was large and that
the fire started near it, the inference that the fire was fed and enlarged
by its presence is a reasonable one. 13
The court's apparent holding that defendant would not be liable if
the fire were set by a third party or an unknown source is ostensibly
based upon a proximate-cause rationale that a defendant's liability must
be stopped short of all consequences it may have caused. If it is assumed
that the court consciously considered the limitation-of-liability question
and further assumed that its decision of that question is correct, then the
only actual-cause question that bears upon liability would be whether
defendant's negligence set the fire. In this posture the court's decision
relating to actual causation is, although still debatable, a more defensi-
ble one.
Neither of the above assumptions can be readily accepted. The part
of the opinion that creates the difficulty of interpretation is set out
below:
The law does not charge a person with all the possible consequences of
his negligence, nor that which is merely possible. A man's responsibil-
ity for his negligence must end somewhere. If the connection between
negligence and the injury appears unnatural, unreasonable, and im-
probable in the light of common experience, the negligence, if deemed
a cause of the injury at all, is to be considered a remote rather than a
proximate cause. It imposes too heavy a responsibility for negligence
to hold the tort-feasor responsible for what is unusual and unlikely to
happen or for what was only remotely and slightly probable."'
While rejection of the decision as a ruling on the limitation-of-liability
"'See Maguire v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 154 N.C. 384,70 S.E. 737 (1911).
"'Reid & Sibell, Inc. v. Gilmore & Edwards Co., 134 Cal. App. 2d 60, 285 P.2d 364 (1st Dist.
1955).
'Phelps v. City of Winston-Salem, 272 N.C. 24, 30, 157 S.E.2d 719,723 (1967).
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question flies squarely in the face of this language of the court, its
acceptance creates an equally difficult problem. Common sense repels
the notion that a fire is an "unnatural," "unreasonable," "improba-
-ble," "unusual," and "unlikely" consequence of a serious fire hazard.
If it is negligent to clutter premises with combustibles and flammables,
the danger of fire is the very risk that makes such conduct unreasonable.
Further, as a proximate-cause ruling, the decision conflicts with estab-
lished precedent in North Carolina 15 and elsewhere." 6 Finally, the prac-
tice of the North Carolina court of blending the actual-cause and the
limitation-of-liability questions.into a single inquiry under the
proximate-cause label has been a frequent source of confusion, even for
the court itself.117
In the type of case under consideration, the court readily recognizes
the force of circumstantial evidence when the proof not only establishes
negligence and harm such negligence could have caused but also shows
other circumstances that tend to tie the two together. The court's willing-
ness to accept circumstantial evidence in these instances is apparent in
cases involving the origin of fires-a situation in which without the
additional proof the court's regard for circumstantial evidence is, as just
seen, less than enthusiastic. If the circumstances tend to pinpoint the
origin of the fire to the precise place of impact of defendant's negligence,
the sufficiency of the evidence to prove actual causation is not ques-
tioned. Thus submission to the jury has been held proper when the
circumstances indicate that the fire started at the place at which defen-
dant had installed faulty electrical wiring"18 or had been working with
an open-flame torch."' The circumstances relating the negligence and
the injury may be so strong that the inference is almost compelling.'
"'See cases cited notes 109-11 supra.
n.PRoSSER 272.
"'For example, in Phelps the court relied upon Maguire v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 154 N.C.
384, 70 S.E. 737 (1911), for the proposition that a defendant who negligently leaves combustibles
on property so as to create a fire hazard is not liable when the combustibles are ignited by a third
person or an unknown cause. The case, properly interpreted, seems to hold only that the evidence
was inadequate to show that the condition of the premises contributed either to the ignition or the
spread of the fire. See also Barefoot v. Joyner, 270 N.C. 388, 154 S.E.2d 543 (1967) (trial court
erroneously defined proximate cause as a cause without which the accident never would have
occurred); Ratliffv. Duke Power Co., 268 N.C. 605, 151 S.E.2d 641 (1966) (same).
"'Jenkins v. Leftwich Elec. Co., 254 N.C. 553, 119 S.E.2d 767 (1961); Drum v. Bisaner, 252
N.C. 305, 113 S.E.2d 560 (1960).
"'Patton v. Dail, 252 N.C. 425, 114 S.E.2d 87 (1960).
'Nance v. Merchants Fertilizer & Phosphate Co., 200 N.C. 702, 158 S.E. 486 (1931) (same
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Just as additional circumstances may strengthen the inference of
causal connection between defendant's negligence and plaintiff's injury,
they may also diminish the force of that inference. The probative value
of the coincidence of the negligence and the injury and the possible
relationship between them that ordinary experience suggests is substan-
tially impaired when additional circumstances tend to negate that
connection 12 or to show that other causes may have brought about the
accident.122 Although the court, in determining the sufficiency of the
evidence for submission to the jury, must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, all the circumstances presented by plain-
tiffs proof may appropriately be considered.
When Capacity of Defendant's Negligence to Cause Harm is
Uncertain. In the cases discussed in the preceding section ordinary ex-
perience indicated that the negligent conduct involved was capable of
causing plaintiff's injury. No evidence was needed to enable that deter-
mination to be made. That speed may cause a driver to lose control of
a car and that faulty electrical wiring may cause a fire are commonly
known. A number of North Carolina cases involve situations in which
a conclusion that defendant's negligence could have caused plaintiff's
injury cannot be based upon common knowledge, and the only founda-
tion for an inference of causal connection is the coincidence in time of
the negligence and the injury.
Wall v. Trogdon'3 effectively illustrates this line of cases. The evid-
ence showed that defendants were spraying crops on land adjacent to
plaintiff's property, that the plane from which the spray was dispensed
passed at low altitudes over lakes on plaintiff's property, that the spray-
acid present in defendant's chemical waste pile, in stream flowing downward from it to plaintiff's
property, in mud holes in hog pen from which hogs drank water, and in entrails of dead hogs);
Masten v. Texas Co., 194 N.C. 540, 140 S.E. 89 (1927) (defendant's gasoline tank, shown to be
leaking, only one within one-half mile of plaintiff's contaminated well; ground sloped downward
from tank to well; underground stream flowed in same direction).
'Hubbard v. Quality Oil Co., 268 N.C. 489, 151 S.E.2d 71 (1966) (location of fire indicated
that vapors from overflow of gasoline at unattended pump could not have caused it; evidence that
overflow, if any, occurred after fire started); Foreman-Blades Lumber Co. v. City of Elizabeth City,
227 N.C. 270, 41 S.E.2d 761 (1947) (two hundred feet separated defendant's brush fire and fire
causing damage).
12'Sanders v. Polk, 264 N.C. 309, 141 S.E.2d 479 (1965) (prostrate body lying in street when
struck by defendant; uncertain whether and how many times body had been run over by others);
J.S. Moore & Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 173 N.C. 311, 92 S.E. 1 (1917) (hazardous
conditions at sawmill where fire occurred thirty minutes after train passed).
1-249 N.C. 747, 107 S.E.2d 757 (1959).
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ing devices used were defective and continued to emit a liquid spray as
the plane passed over the lakes, and that the following day the water in
the lakes was covered with an oily substance and the fish in the lakes
were dead or dying. The court held that the evidence established no
causal connection between the death of the fish and the defendant's
negligence. The deficiency in the evidence seen by the court was its failure
to show that the spray contained any substance harmful to fish or to
show what caused the fish to die. A similar holding has been reached in
other cases in which plaintiff has shown that his injury occurred immedi-
ately after contact with a substance to which he was negligently exposed
by defendant but has offered no proof that the substance was capable
of causing the injury.'24
In all of these cases additional evidence was clearly available to the
plaintiff. Reasonable effort could have produced proof that the sub-
stance contained harmful ingredients, that those ingredients were capa-
ble of causing the injury, and, perhaps, that they or similar ingredients
in fact caused the injury. The apparent availability of other evidence may
be one reason why the court holds the proof in these cases insufficient
for submission to the jury. The major thrust of each opinion seems to
be a roll call of the missing evidence. For example, in Wall the Court
observed: "In the first place there is no evidence as to elements constitut-
ing the spray used in spraying the crops. If there were poison in the spray
there is no evidence that it was poisonous to fish. If it were poisonous
to fish there is no evidence that the fish died from the poison."'' 5 In
Hanrahan v. Walgreen Co.' 26 -the Court further observed that
"7Reason v. Singer Sewing Mach. Co., 259 N.C. 264, 130 S.E.2d 397 (1963) (warm oil sprayed
in plaintiff's face; her eyes soon thereafter began to burn and to water, and the following day a
specialist found severe burns of her eyelids and conjunctiva where the oil had been sprayed; insuffi-
cient for submission to jury; no showing that oil contained chemicals that could cause burns);
Martin v. Jewel Box, Inc., 6 N.C. App. 429, 431, 170 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1969) (plaintiff became
immediately ill when she inhaled powder released from broken fluorescent light tube; insufficient
for submission to jury: "[the] evidence is completely devoid of any proof of what elements the tube,
or powder, contained or whether whatever it contained was or could be harmful if inhaled." Cf.
Hanrahan v. Walgreen Co., 243 N.C. 268, 90 S.E.2d 392 (1955) (breach of warranty action;
plaintiff, after using defendant's hair rinse, had weeping dermatitis of scalp, face, and neck, and
scalp of plaintiff's girl friend became red and inflammed after using same rinse; insufficient for
submission to jury; no evidence hair rinse contained any poisonous or deleterious ingredient);
Mauney v. Luzier's Inc., 215 N.C. 673, 2 S.E.2d 888 (1939) (breach of warranty action; "breaking
out" on face after use of defendant's cosmetics; insufficient for submission to jury; no showing of
the nature of the skin condition or of its cause).
'Wall v. Trogdon, 249 N.C. 747, 754, 107 S.E.2d 757, 762 (1959).
-243 N.C. 268, 90 S.E.2d 392 (1955).
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"La]lthough three of the capsules [of hair rinse] were in [plaintiff's]
possession, she produced no analysis of them showing they contained
any deleterious substance." 12 7
The willingness of a jury to draw inferences from the facts proved
may be adversely affected by the absence of other evidence that appar-
ently could have been produced by plaintiff. However, the effect of its
absence upon the determination of the sufficiency of the evidence offered
for submission to the jury seems significantly less unless the court under-
takes more weighing of the evidence than seems appropriate for this
decision. Admittedly, the plaintiff's plight does not engender great sym-
pathy or call for a policy exception 128 to normal causation rules to avoid
a situation in which it would otherwise be impossible for plaintiff to
establish the causal connection. On the other hand, no significant possi-
bility of unfairness to defendant is created by submitting the case to the
jury. The missing evidence is equally as available to defendant as to
plaintiff, and, if it negates or weakens an inference of causal connection,
such evidence can be introduced by him.
Of course, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff, and these
observations are not intended to suggest any modification of that re-
quirement. The basic inquiry involved in these cases is simply whether
plaintiff's evidence permits an inference that defendant's negligence
likely caused his injury. If such an inference can be drawn, the case
should be submitted to the jury, and the fact that other evidence may
have been available but was not introduced should not lead to a different
decision. If proof that warm oil was sprayed into plaintiff's face and
eyes, that his eyes immediately began to burn and to water, and that the
irritation continued until the following day when it was determined that
his eye lids and conjunctiva were burned where the oil had sprayed
permits a reasonable inference that the oil caused the burns-as it cer-
tainly seems to do-the case should be submitted to the jury. While
proof that the burns were caused by a chemical and that the oil contained
chemicals capable of causing the burns would have established the causal
connection with great certainty and while such a strong foundation for
factual findings is always to be desired, neither consideration bears im-
portantly upon the sufficiency of the evidence actually before the court.
The holding in one case, if its facts can be viewed to parallel those
I1d. at 269, 90 S.E.2d at 393.
'?See text accompanying notes 45-92 supra.
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of the cases under consideration, is contrary to the position of the court
set out in the preceding discussion. In Harper v. Bulluck12 1 plaintiff
became seriously ill and died after eating weiners made of decomposed
meat. A friend who ate some of the weiners also became ill. The proof
was held sufficient to be submitted to the jury. The facts of the case,
however, can be readily distinguished. Here the proof showed that the
substance was dangerous, while in none of the other cases was this fact
shown. Arguably, this additional fact is not critical unless the evidence
indicates that the dangers shown to be present were capable of producing
the injury. That decomposed meat can cause serious physical injury
seems clearly to be a matter of common knowledge. Thus specific proof
that it could have caused plaintiff's injury was not needed. These two
additional facts unquestionably make the proof in Harper substantially
stronger than it was in the other cases.
When Proof Shows Only the Occurrence-Res Ipsa Loquitur. If
defendant's negligence is not shown to have been in operation at the time
of'the accident but nevertheless can be identified as a possible cause of
the accident, the choice among possible causes is a more difficult one.'
Evidence that establishes defendant's connection with the accident may
be enough to permit the inference that his negligence could have caused
it. A possible cause of almost any untoward event is the negligence of
persons involved in it. However, if nothing more is shown, it cannot be
said that the negligence of those involved is either the sole possible cause
or necessarily the more probable one.'M The majority of cases that fit
this description are decided under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. In
such cases the determination made by the courts concerns the sufficiency
of the proof to establish defendant's negligence. Usually, however, that
determination is made-once defendant's negligence is identified as a
possible cause of the accident-by ascertaining whether defendant's neg-
ligence, among the various possible causes of the accident, is more prob-
ably the cause than the others.
1198 N.C. 448, 152 S.E. 405 (1941).
"E.g., Dickerson v. Norfolk S. R.R., 190 N.C. 292, 129 S.E. 810 (1925) (fact that defendant's
train engine, emitting heavy black smoke, passed and repassed plaintiff's property on which fire
was discovered one hour later does not permit inference that defendant's negligence set fire); Zurich
Ins. Co. v. Multi-Ply Corp., 6 N.C. App. 467, 170 S.E.2d 526 (1969) (fact that inflammable lacquer
used in defendant's plywood finishing plant, without proof of improper handling or storage, does
not permit inference that fire which started in plant was caused by defendant's negligence).
"'E.g., Haynes v. Horton, 261 N.C. 615, 135 S.E.2d 582 (1964) (customer slipped and fell on
floor of defendant's business establishment).
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Res ipsa loquitur3 is a form of circumstantial evidence in which
proof of the occurrence alone is held sufficient to permit an inference
that it was caused by defendant's negligence. 11 It does not relax the
normal requirements of proof that must be met by plaintiff to establish
the cause of action 134 but simply recognizes that common experience
sometimes permits a reasonable inference of negligence and causation
from the occurrence itself.135 Thus for the doctrine to apply the accident
must be one that does not occur in the ordinary course of things without
negligence. When the proof establishes such a happening, an inference
of negligence arises, although the possibility that the occurrence was an
unavoidable accident still exists. 36
The proof must permit the inference that defendant's negligence
was the cause of the accident. Although the proof permits an inference
that negligence caused the accident, if the likelihood that someone else
was culpable is equally as great as the possibility that defendant was at
fault, the proof is inadequate. 37 Thus, in the absence of other circum-
stances, res ipsa does not apply when two cars collide 38 or when a car
strikes a pedestrian 39 since, as between the parties, the likelihood of fault
is equal. The traditional statement of the rule requires that the instru-
mentality causing the injury be in the exclusive management and control
132The following paragraphs are a brief summary of the author's fuller discussion in Byrd,
Proof of Negligence in North Carolina-Part L Res Ipsa Loquitur, 48 N.C.L. REv. 452 (1970).
The present discussion attempts only to show the involvement of the causal concept in the applica-
tion of the doctrine.
'O'Brien v. Parks Cramer Co., 196 N.C. 359, 145 S.E. 684 (1928).
134Young v. Anchor Co., 239 N.C. 288, 79 S.E.2d 785 (1954) (charge that permitted verdict
for plaintiff without finding negligence held erroneous); Kiger v. Liipfert Scales Co., 162 N.C. 133,
78 S.E. 76 (1913) (same). See also Trull v. Carolina-Virginia Well Co., 264 N.C. 687, 693, 142
S.E.2d 622, 626 (1965) ("The rule of absolute and strict liability differs from the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur in that the former . . . operates regardless of . . . negligence, while the latter is a
rule of evidence which operates as primafacie proof of negligence.").
'Greene v. Nichols, 274 N.C. 18, 161 S.E.2d 521 (1968); Overcash v. Charlotte Elec. Ry.
Light & Power Co., 144 N.C. 572,57 S.E. 377 (1907).
IuBoone v. Matheny, 224 N.C. 250, 29 S.E.2d 687 (1944); Etheridge v. Etheridge, 222 N.C.
616, 24 S.E.2d 477 (1943).
1'Kekelis v. Whitin Mach. Works, 273 N.C. 439, 160 S.E.2d 320 (1968); Wilson v. Perkins,
211 N.C. 110, 189 S.E. 179 (1937).
'uSwainey v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 202 N.C. 272, 162 S.E. 557 (1932) (truck and bicycle);
Burke v. Carolina Coach Co., 198 N.C. 8, 150 S.E. 636 (1929).
'mMeegan v. Grubbs, 253 N.C. 63, 116 S.E.2d 151 (1960); Rogers v. Green, 252 N.C. 214,
113 S.E.2d 364 (1960).
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of the defendant and in this way identifies the defendant as the responsi-
ble party.10
Plaintiff's possession, operation, or other use of the instrumentality
that injured him may foreclose the inference that the accident was caused
by the defendant's negligence. If the accident is one that could have been
caused by negligent use or operation, then, in the absence of evidence of
proper handling,' 4' it is no more probable that defendant's negligence
caused the accident than that plaintiff's own conduct was the cause.'
For the same reason possession or control of the instrumentality by a
third person at the time of the accident or in the interim after it leaves
defendant's control and the happening of the accident, unless reasonably
accounted for, precludes the inference that defendant's negligence likely
caused the accident. 4 3 When the nature of the accident or the way in
which it occurred indicates that possession and control of the plaintiff
or others played no material part in the accident, an inference of defen-
dant's negligence is permissible.'4
In these situations evidence that tends to negate other possible
causes of the accident strengthens the inference that defendant's negli-
gence was the cause. 45 Thus, evidence eliminating weather, road, and
"100'Quinn v. Southard, 269 N.C. 385, 152 S.E.2d 538 (1967) (defendant's exclusive control
absent); Trull v. Carolina-Virginia Well Co., 264 N.C. 687, 142 S.E.2d 622 (1965) (same).
'"Kekelis v. Whitin Mach. Works, 273 N.C. 439, 160 S.E.2d 320 (1968); Bryant v. Burns-
Hammond Constr. Co., 197 N.C. 639, 150 S.E. 122 (1929).
112Wyatt v. North Carolina Equip. Co., 253 N.C. 355, 117 S.E.2d 21 (1960) (front-end loader
tilted forward; no showing whether operated on incline or level area).
"'Kekelis v. Whitin Mach. Co., 273 N.C. 439, 160 S.E.2d 320 (1968) (res ipsa inapplicable
because of failure to account for intermediary's careful handling of machine); Wilcox v. Glover
Motors, Inc., 269 N.C. 473,482, 153 S.E.2d 76, 83 (1967) ("The doctrine of res ipsa loqultur does
not apply to a brake failure several hours and many miles after delivery of the car" by the dealer
to the prospective purchaser.).
1
"Schueler v. Good Friend N.C. Corp., 231 N.C. 416, 57 S.E.2d 324 (1950) (row of chairs
tilted over when plaintiff sat down in one of them); Eaker v. International Shoe Co., 199 N.C. 379,
154 S.E. 667 (1930) (machine started operating by itself); Lindsey v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
173 N.C. 390, 92 S.E. 166 (1917) (when bolt on floor of train of type used to fasten rails and
frequently carried by railroad employees, unlikely that third person placed it there); Marcom v.
Raleigh & A. Air Line R.R.., 126 N.C. 200, 35 S.E. 423 (1900) (malicious conduct of others
unlikely cause of defect in railroad tract). But see Wilcox v. Glover Motors, Inc., 269 N.C. 473,
153 S.E.2d 76 (1967) (car brakes failed a few hours after plaintiff took possession from dealer; no
exclusive control); Harward v. General Motors Corp., 235 N.C. 88, 68 S.E.2d 855 (1952) (steering
mechanism of new car locked; no exclusive control; decision rendered seemingly without regard to
duration of plaintiff's possession).
" There is a remarkable series of cases in which circumstantial evidence eliminated all possible
causes of the accident other than defendant's negligence. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Snowden,
267 N.C. 749, 148 S.E.2d 833 (1966); Randall v. Rogers, 262 N.C. 544, 138 S.E.2d 248 (1964);
Lane v. Dorney, 252.N.C. 90, 113 S.E.2d 33 (1960).
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traffic conditions as possible causes of defendant's car leaving the road
makes it more probable that the cause was the driver's negligence."' If
defendant's health and the mechanical condition of the car are accounted
for, the probability that defendant's negligence was the cause becomes
even greater. 4 7 Sometimes, other factors, even though they are not ex-
pressly eliminated by the evidence as possible causes of the accident, can
be easily dismissed.148 Possible causes which, had they been present,
would likely have been disclosed by proof of the happening itself and
those occurrences which rarely happen in the normal course of events
fit into this category and deserve serious consideration only if positive
evidence of their presence is introduced.
Similarly, evidence which demonstrates that other causes may have
played a prominent part in what has happened may so weaken the
inference of defendant's negligence that the proof establishes merely a
possibility that defendant's negligence caused the accident. Any infer-
ence of negligence from proof that a dress upon which brown spots were
discovered was in good condition when it was delivered to the dry clean-
ers is substantially weakened if the proof also shows the spots were first
discovered one week after its return from the cleaners and after it had
been worn to a party.
'Greene v. Nichols, 274 N.C. 18, 161 S.E.2d 521 (1968).
'Id. (by implication).
'Greene v. Nichols, 274 N.C. 18, 26, 161 S.E.2d 521, 526 (1968) ("Highway defects or the
negligence of another could cause a car to leave the road. The presence of either of these causes,
however, would ordinarily be apparent. Mechanical defects in the vehicle or driver-illness could
cause an automobile to leave the road, but these possible causes occur comparatively infrequently
and their probability can ordinarily be negated."); Marcom v. Raleigh & A. Air Line R.R., 126
N.C. 200, 35 S.E. 423 (1900) (malicious conduct of other unlikely cause of defect in railroad tract);
Cherry v. Smallwood, 7 N.C. App. 56, 58, 171 S.E.2d 83, 84 (1969) (Res ipsa applied although
"[t]here was no evidence as to what road was involved or whether the road was wet or dry, paved
or unpaved. Neither was there evidence of defects in the road, mechanical defects in the vehicle,
speed of the vehicle, or illness of the driver.").
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